Abstract. This paper analyzes collective outcomes in games from a revealed preference perspective. A collective choice function is rationalizable if there are such "rational" individual preferences, that the observed choices are the only equilibria. We consider a generalized concept of Nash equilibrium, which should be robust to deviation by not only individuals but some exogenously given coalitions as well. The paper provides sufficient conditions as well as necessary conditions for the collective choice function to be rationalizable given some notion of rationality. In addition, we show that the conditions coincide and become a criteria if we relax the definition of equilibrium to the standard definition of Nash.
Introduction
Revealed preference theory, established by Samuelson (1938) addresses the problem that preferences of agents may not be observable, while we can observe the choices. This approach has been used to E-mail address: (Freer) mfreer@gmu.edu.
Date: March, 2017 . develop and apply tests for individual choice functions to be consistent with particular assumptions about preferences.
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However, the literature on testable implication of the collective choice is sparser. Sprumont (2000) provides necessary and sufficient conditions for collective choice function to be rationalizable as a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, using transitivity and completeness as notion of rationality. Ray and Zhou (2001) addresses the question of rationalizability as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under transitive and complete preferences. Demuynck and Lauwers (2009) (2000) finding providing the criteria for rationalizability as Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, assuming independence, transitivity and completeness as notion of rationality. In addition there are several papers studying the testable implications of the particular (classes of) games 2 and the papers investigating the rationalizability of the collective choice as the result of maximizing Pareto relation, 3 which are not directly related to the subject of this paper.
Nash equilibrium was initially criticized for its weakness comparing to cooperative solution concepts. The basis for the criticism is that Nash equilibrium robust only for deviations by individual players. Aumann (1959) proposed the concept of strong Nash equilibrium which requires every equilibrium to be robust to deviations of any coalition, 1 Afriat (1967) and Richter (1966) proposed a test for existence of utility function that rationalizes observed behavior. Varian (1983) provides tests for homothetic rationalizability and existence of exptected utility function that rationalizes preferences. Forges and Minelli (2009) provides test for existence of concave utility function. Echenique and Saito (2015) provides test for existence of subjective expected utility. Chambers and Echenique (2016) contains the systematic overview of the revealed preference results.
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For instance, Cherchye et al. (2013) and Carvajal et al. (2013) study the empirical implications of Cournot competition, Lee (2012) investigates testable implications of equilibrium behavior in zero-sum games. and Bernheim et al. (1987) proposed coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, which requires every equilibrium to be robust to the deviations of any sustainable coalition. Both of those concepts are to some extent extreme -they allow every set of players to form a coalition. Myerson (1977) proposed a more general idea of the games with coalitional structure. The set of coalitions which can be formed by players is exogenous, and only those coalitions can deviate. We follow this approach and consider equilibrium which is robust for a deviation by any coalition from a given set of coalitions.
Standard notion of rationality (includes transitivity, completeness, independence) was criticized based on experimental evidence on observed behavior in the context of individual decision making as well as in game theoretic settings. Since Allais (1953) Quiggin (1982) , Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) ).
Another assumption which is usually critized -selfish behavior, that is formally stated as monotonicity with respect to the monetary payoffs.
In particular types of games this assumption can be violated because one may care about other players' payoffs (e.g. Charness and Rabin (2002) ), inequality (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) ) et cetera. Generalized version of rationality we use allows for any of (testable) competing theories as the notion of rationality.
This paper provides sufficient conditions as well as necessary conditions for the collective choice function to be rationalizable as a coalitional Nash equilibrium (given the coalitional structure) under generalized version of rationality. Moreover, we show that if we relax definition of equilibrium to the Nash equilibrium (keeping the generalized notion of rationality), then the necessary and sufficient conditions coincide.
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See Ellsberg (1961) , Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Battalio et al. (1985) and Holt (1986) for experimental designs and results.
However, we show that Nash rationalization is neither necessary nor sufficient for the coalitional Nash rationazation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides necessary definitions. Section 3 presents results of the paper.
Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. All proofs not in the text are collected in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
Let N " t1, . . . , nu be the set of players. For every j P N let X j be the set of possible strategies. Let X " Ś jPN X j be the set of possible strategy profiles (joint outcomes). Let G Ď tG Ď X : DH ‰ Y j Ď X j and G " Ś jPN Y j ‰ Hu be the set of non-empty Cartesian product sets induced by X, which are the observed games.
that is a subgame of the game G in which the strategies of N zK are fixed. A set of observed games G satisfies domain restriction if there are G x K P G for every G P G, for every K P K and for every x P G.
A collective choice function C : G Ñ 2 X assigns to every element G of
is K-noncooperative when for every G P G, x P CpGq if and only if
Further we use term noncoooperative for N -noncooperative collective choice functions. Note that K-noncooperativeness is a synonym of the "consistency" condition, the latter is a property of (coalition-proof) Nash equilibrium (see Peleg and Tijs (1996) ). Here and further Player 1 chooses rows, Player 2 -columns and Player 3 -matrices. Asterisk symbol denotes the chosen cell. DRS is chosen from the G, and therefore it has to be chosen by every individual (see
Figure 1. K-noncooperative collective choice function, for coalitional structure K " tt1u, t2u, t3u, t1, 2uu
and 2 can form a coalition, there is an additional subgame G DRS t1,2u and DRS should be chosen from that subgame as well.
Note that Figure 1 illustrates only the "forward" implication of Knoncooperative behavior, that is if x is chosen in a game G, then it should be chosen by every G x K . However, it is also necessary that if y is not chosen, then there is at least one K P K, such that y is not chosen from G y K . For instance, U LF , there is at least one player or coalition that prefers not to choose U LF from G U LF K .
(Revealed) Preferences
A set R Ď XˆX is said to be a preference relation. We denote the set of all preference relations on X by R. We denote the inverse relation R´1 " tpx, yq|py, xq P Ru.
We denote the symmetric (indifferent) part of R by IpRq " R X R´1 and the asymmetric (strict) part by P pRq " RzIpRq. We denote the incomparable part by N pRq " XˆXzpR Y R´1q. A preference relation R is complete if px, yq P R Y R´1 for all x, y P X (or equivalently N pRq " H). A preference relation R is transitive if px, yq P R and py, zq P R implies px, zq P R.
Every collective choice function generates a revealed preference re- DL from the game G and DR from the gameG. Then, pDL, DRq P P pR 1 pGqq and pDR, DLq P P pR 1 pGqq. Therefore, pDL, DRq P IpR 1 q, hence, P pR 1 pGqq Ę R 1 . This implies, that R 1 can not be an extension of R 1 pGq.
Notion of Rationality
We use functions over preference relations to impose the notion of rationality. The simplest example of such a function is the transitive closure, which adds px, zq to R, whenever there is a finite sequence x " y 1 , . . . , y n " z, such that R contains py j , y j`1 q for every j " 1, . . . , n´1. The transitive closure allows every preference relation which can be extended by its transitive closure to have a complete and transitive extension (see Richter (1966) ).
Definition 2. A function F : R Ñ R is said to be
-algebraic if for all R P R and all px, yq P F pRq, there is a
-weakly expansive if for any R " F pRq and N pRq ‰ H, there
Any function F : R Ñ R that is monotone, closed and idempotent is called a closure. A closure is algebraic as defined above if any element of the closure can be obtained from applying the closure to a finite subset of the original relation. 5 Weak expansiveness impose conditions on the fixed points of F . 6 In particular, it guarantees that for every fixed point of F there is a set of non-comparable pairs (comparisons) which can be added to the fixed point, such that the enlarged relation can be extended by F . Demuynck (2009) shows that if F is a weakly expansive algebraic closure, then existence of a complete fixed point extension of preference relation is equivalent to the fact that this preference relation can be extended by F .
As we already mentioned the idea behind F is to impose the desired properties or the "notion of rationality". Further we assume that every notion of rationality includes transitivity and completeness of preference relations. A function F : R Ñ R induces transitivity if T pF pRqq " F pRq. That is, every fixed point of F is also a fixed point
5 See e.g. Davey and Priestley (2002) , definition 7.12.
6 Fixed point of F is such R, that F pRq " R.
of T , and as it was shown by Demuynck (2009) every fixed point of T is a transitive relation.
2.3 Equilibrium Given a relation R on a set X and a subset G Ď X, we denote by M pR, Gq " tx P G|@y P G, py, xq R P pRqu the set of maximal elements of G according to the relation R. Let R j for j P N be individual preference relations of players. Denote by Π K the Pareto relation, px, yq P Π K if and only if px, yq P R j for all j P N .
Equivalently Pareto relation can be defined as Π K " Ş jPK R j . The set of maximal elements can be defined for any preference relation (complete or not), therefore, it can be defined for Pareto relation as well. Note that for every singleton coalition Pareto relation is equal to the preference relation of the player. Before we proceed note that game can be defined as a tuple pG, Rq, where G P G and R " pR 1 , . . . , R n q is preference profile.
Definition 3. A joint outcome x P X is K-Nash equilibrium of pG, R˚q if and only if x P M pΠK, G x K q for every K P K.
K-Nash equilibrium has two special cases, one of which is Nash equilibrium (only coalitions are players on their own) and strong Nash equilibrium (every subset of players is a coalition). Further we refer to the N -Nash equilibrium as to Nash equilibrium.
Rationalizable when there is Rj " F pRj q for every j P N , such that @G P G, x P CpGq if and only if x is K-Nash equilibrium of pG, R˚q.
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Further we refer to the pF, N q-Nash rationalizability as to F -Nash rationalizability.
7 We assume the common notion of rationality. Formally we can assign every player individual F j according to which she should rational, and all the further results hold under that assumption. However, we keep the assumption of the common notion of rationality, because individual notions of rationality seem artificial.
Results
Before we present the results let us state the assumptions which are persistently made in every statement. We assume F to be a weakly expansive algebraic closure that induces transitivity. Moreover, we assume that G satisfies domain restriction. Both assumptions do not relate to the collective choice function. They rather specify the properties of the domain of the observed games and the properties of the notion of rationality.
-R K satisfies internal consistency for every K P K,
Idea of the proof is to assign every player the preference relation that is an extension of F pR Kj q. Demuynck (2009) shown that there is a complete fixed point extension of such relation which is an extension of F pR Kj q, which is an extension of R j (by transitivity of ĺ).
Therefore, the set of maximal elements would coincide with the observed choices function at the individual level. Maximal elements of the Pareto relation (based on the completed individual preference relations) would coincide with the observed choices at the coalitional level, since every individual preference relation takes into account the revealed preferences of coalitions.
Proposition 2 (Necessary Conditions
-R j satisfies internal consistency for every j P N , -R j ĺ R Kj for every j P N , and -R j ĺ F pR j q for every j P N .
Necessary and sufficient conditions have similar structure, however, they are different except the first one. K-noncooperative behavior stands for the noncooperative nature of decision making. Internal consistency is the condition which guarantees that there is some complete preference relation which drives all the observed choices. Moreover, we require individual preference relations to be consistent with the coalitional preferences. The major difference is in the last condition, that requires a revealed preference relations to be extendable by F . Recall that this is equivalent to the existence of complete fixed point extension of the preference relation. It is obviously necessary to guarantee the existence of the complete extension of the individual revealed preference relations, however, does not have to be true for the coalitional preferences.
Partial Rationalizability Rationalizability definition requires
not only all the chosen points to be equilibria, but also that all nonchosen points not to be equilibria. Note that the latter heavily relies on domain restriction. Therefore, if we want to relax the domain restriction we have to relax rationalizability concept as well. A collective choice function C : G Ñ 2 X is said to be partially pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable then there is Rj " F pRj q for every j P N , such that @G P G, if x P CpGq then x is K-Nash equilibrium of pG, R˚q.
Remark 1 (Partial pF, Kq-Nash Rationalizability). Every C : G Ñ 2 X is partially pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable.
To show this let us assume that R j " XˆX for every j P N . Hence, every player is indifferent between every pair of joint outcomes, and all of them are K-Nash equilibria. Therefore, every outcome of the joint choice function is K-Nash equilibrium as well.
Remark 1 shows that partial rationalizability does not have empirical content. This result is in line with the finding in Sprumont (2000) , that every collective choice function is partially Nash rationalizable if we take complete and transitive preferences as a notion of rationality.
3.2 F -Nash Rationalizability F -Nash rationalizability is the extreme case under which K " N and is a generalization of the Nash rationalizability for an arbitrary notion of rationality. The only allowed coalitions in this case are K " tju for some j P N . Hence, necessary (Proposition 2) and sufficient (Proposition 1) conditions become equivalent, since R Kj " R j .
Corollary 1 (Nash Rationalizability). C : G Ñ 2 X is F -Nash rationalizable if and only if -C is noncooperative,
-R j satisfies internal consistency for every j P N , and
Corollary 1 is a generalization of the results from Sprumont (2000) and Demuynck and Lauwers (2009) . First assumes only finite sets of alternatives and uses transitivity and completeness as a notion of rationality. Second assumes sets of alternatives to be the mixture space over the finite set of alternatives and uses transitivity, independence and completeness as a notion of rationality.
Discussion
We address three major points in this discussion. First, we show that sufficient conditions are not tight, that is provide an example of pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable collective choice function that fails sufficient conditions. Second, we show that F -Nash rationalizability is not sufficient for pF, Kq-Nash rationalizability of the collective choice function.
Third, we show that pF, Kq-Nash rationalizability is not sufficient for the F -Nash rationalizability of the collective choice function. Figure 3 illustrates the case of rationalizable collective choice function that violates internal consistency of R K . This follows from the fact that pU L, DRq P P pRpGqq, because U L is chosen and DR is not and at the same time pU L, DRq P IpRpGqq because both points are chosen. However, the underlying Pareto ordering can contain Figure 3 . pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable collective choice function, which violates internal consistency of R K . K " tt1u.t2u, t1, 2uu By construction of R K every point that is chosen is better than every point that is not chosen, this does not have to be true in general.
Therefore, formally there may be such coalitonal preferences that every non-chosen point is dominated at least by one chosen point, and at least one of those relations has to be internally consistent. There are many of such "candidate relations", hence, the condition that includes them would not be easily testable.
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However, there is a consistency condition for R K which is necessary for the rationalization of collective choice function. We also use that condition to show that pF, Kq-Nash rationalizability has an empirical content comparing to F -Nash rationalizability. That is, there is an FNash rationalizable function, which is not pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable.
Remark 2. If C : G Ñ 2 X be an pF, Kq-Nash Rationalizable collective choice function, then, for every
The condition stated in the remark is the type of extension condition, but we cannot claim that theR K is an extension of Ş jPK F pR j q, because formally the latter does not have to be a subset ofR K .
Consider collective choice function from Figure 5 and function F , such that F pRq " R Y tpU L, DRqu. Obviously, F is a weakly expansive algebraic closure. Collective choice function does not violate conditions from Corollary 1, therefore, it is F -Nash rationalizable. However, if t1, 2u P K, then this collective choice function is not pF, KqNash rationalizable, because it contains a violation of the Remark 2.
Note that F pR 1 q " tpU L, DLq, pDR, U Rq, pU L, DRqu and F pR 2 q " tpU L, U Rq, pDR, DLq, pU L, DRqu, hence, P pF pR 1 qXF pR 2" tpU L, DRqu. While R t1,2u contains both pU L, DRq and pDR, U Lq, because both points are chosen and therefore, equivalent. Figure 6 illustrates the example of the pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable collective choice function which is not F -Nash rationalizable. Note, that DR is chosen in both G DR t1u and G DR t2u , however, is not chosen by the coalition t1, 2u, hence, DR cannot be K-Nash equilibrium in the game, regardless that it is obviously, Nash equilibrium. Therefore, this function is not F -Nash rationalizable, because it fails the noncoopera- Figure 5 . Collective choice function which is F -Nash rationalizable, but not pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable. K " tt1u.t2u, t1, 2uu
Concluding Remarks
We can bring some "economic flavour" into the rationalization concept by using the generalized notion of equilibrium. One can think that preferences should respect some partial order, for instance, monotonicity in payoffs (selfishness), first order stochastic dominance or inequality aversion. Any property which can be expressed as a partial order can be simply incorporated into F (see Demuynck (2009) ) and, therefore, included in the notion of rationality.
Note that, we consider only complete information games. We as well assume beliefs to be rational, and consistent with the infinite regression of rationality, that is "A knows that B knows that A knows ... that Proof can be found in Demuynck (2009) .
Proof can be found in Freer and Martinelli (2016) .
Lemma 2. Let A be a finite collection of sets. Let R be a preference relation, so that R ĺ R A for every A P A. Then R ĺ Ť APA R A .
Proof. Obviously R Ď Ť APA R K . On the contrary assume the contrary, there is py, xq P P pRq such that px, yq P Ť APA R A . Then px, yq P R T for some T P A. But then R does not extend R A . Observation 1. For every i ‰ j P´1pR i q X R j " H.
Proof. This follows from the simple fact, that G x j Y G x i " txu. Recall that R i and R j contain pairs px, yq, and the only pair they can contain is px, xq P IpRq if x was chosen.
Lemma 2 and Observation 1 allow us to prove the following lemma.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that this is not true, then py, xq P P pRq
it cannot be true by assumption of the Lemma. For every singleton i ‰ j it cannot be true by Observation 1. Then we can conclude the proof by applying Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. By definition of pF, Kq-Nash rationalizability, there exist Rj " F pRj q for every j P N , such that x is a K-Nash equilibrium if and only if x P M pG x K , ΠKq for every K P K. The proof is organized as follows,
(1) We construct complete extensions of R j , which are fixed points of F , (2) We show that according to those extensions x is K-Nash equilibrium if and only if it is chosen from G: (2.1) We show that every chosen joint outcome is K-Nash equilibrium, i.e. is a maximal element in G x K for every K P K, (2.2) We show that every element which is not chosen cannot be a K-Nash equilibrium.
(1) Note that we guaranteed that R j is internally consistent and R j ĺ R Kj ĺ F pR Kj q. Hence, Proposition 3 implies that there is a complete fixed point extension Rj such that F pR Kj q ĺ Rj " F pRj q.
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Then, by transitivity of ĺ we can conclude that R j ĺ Rj .
(2.1) By K-noncooperativeness x P CpGq if and only if x P CpG x K q for every K P K. Hence, y P G x K : px, yq P R K Ď F pR Kj q Ď Rj for all j P K. Then, px, yq P ΠK, this implies that there is no py, xq P P pΠKq, because P represents the asymmetric part of relation.
(2.2) Let x P GzCpGq. By domain restriction and K-noncooperativeness
Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 4. If C : G Ñ 2 X is pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable then R j ĺ Rj .
Proof. First let us show that R j Ď Rj . Take px, yq P R j , then x was chosen in some game in which y was present. Hence, x P CpG x j q " M pG x j , Rj q, since x is a maximal element there is no y which is strictly preferred to it, then by completeness of Rj px, yq P Rj . Now let us show that P pR j q Ď P pRj q. Take px, yq P P pR j q, then for G x j x P CpG x j q and y R CpG x j q, hence, x is a maximal element i G x j , according to Rj . Then, by completeness and transitivity of Rj for every y P G x j zCpG x j q, px, yq P P pRj q.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose a collective choice function C : G Ñ 2 X is pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable. First note that C is K-noncooperative.
For all x P CpGq no coalition has a profitable deviation, otherwise x R M pΠK, Gq. If x R CpGq, then x is not K-Nash equilibrium and there is K P K, such that x R M pG x K , Π x K q. This implies, that x can not be K-Nash equilibrium of G x K P G and therefore, cannot be chosen from G x K .
9 Recall that F is an idempotent function, therefore, F pRq is trivially F consistent. This extension is an extension of R j by transitivity of ĺ relation.
10 In this case completeness guarantees that px, yq P Rj and transitivity guarantees that px, yq R IpRj q, because otherwise y has to be maximal point as well.
Assume R j is not internally consistent. Then, by Lemma 1 there is G x j such that py, xq P P pRpG y jand px, yq P R j . According to Lemma 4 px, yq P IpRj q. Hence, completeness of Rj implies, that if y is a maximal element in G y j , then x has to be maximal element as well. Since C is pF, Kq-Nash rationalizable, then all maximal elements has to be chosen, i.e. x P CpG y j q, this implies, that px, yq P R j pG y j q. This part is proven by Lemma 3, hence we need to show that P´1pR j qX R K " H for every j P K P K Assume to the contrary that px, yq P P´1pR j q X R K for some j P K P K. This implies, that there is G x K P G such that x P CpG x K q, then by K-noncooperativeness x P CpG x j q for every j P K. At the same time py, xq P P pR j q implies, that y P CpG 1y j q and x P G 1x j . This implies that y can be obtained from x by individual deviation. Recall that y P G x K , then y P G x j , hence, px, yq P R j . This implies, that py, xq R P pR j q.
F -consistency of R j follows from Proposition 3 and Lemma 4, since F is a weakly expansive algebraic closure, if R j is not F -consistent then there is no fixed point extension of it.
